

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 102168
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY:IO/UNA:JFTEFFT

S/S-O:SVALERGA

-----123198 210925Z /21

R 210717Z APR 78 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000

S E C R E T STATE 102168

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG FROM UNA

FOL MOGADISCIO 865 SENT ACTION SECSTATE APR 20, 1978 REPEATED
TO YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T MOGADISCIO 0865

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: MASS, US, SO

SUBJ: ARMS SALES TO SOMALIA

REF: STATE 096178

SUMMARY: ON APRIL 19 PRESIDENT SIAD INDICATED HE WOULD ACCEPT
OUR TERMS ON THE INITIAL SUPPLY OF ARMS TO SOMALIA INCLUDING
THE VISIT OF A MILITARY SURVEY MISSION. HE HAS NOT YET
REPLIED IN WRITING, BUT INDICATED HE WOULD DO SO PROMPTLY.
THE SOMALI LEADER MADE A RENEWED APPEAL FOR A US GUARANTEE
OF SOMALI BORDERS. HE REPEATED HIS GRAVE CONCERN FOR THE
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SECURITY OF HIS COUNTRY. END SUMMARY.

1. I CALLED UPON PRESIDENT SIAD YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 19,
SHORTLY AFTER THE PRESIDENT RETURNED FROM HIS CHINA TRIP. IT
WAS NOT MY INTENTION TO PRESS FOR AN AUDIENCE IMMEDIATELY, BUT
HIS SECRETARIAT MISUNDERSTOOD MY INQUIRY ABOUT HIS RETURN,
AND INSTEAD ARRANGED A MEETING FORTHWITH. THE DCM ACCOMPANIED

ME. I REVIEWED CAREFULLY FOR SIAD THE TALKING POINTS IN REFTEL. THE SOMALI LEADER, WHO APPEARED SOMEWHAT FATIGUED AS THE SESSION GOT UNDERWAY, BRIGHTENED PERCEPTIBLY AS WE REACHED THE BUSINESS AT HAND. HE WAS ALTERNATELY STERN AND DRAMATIC, AND THEN RELAXED AND JOVIAL IN THE TWO-AND-A-QUARTER-HOUR SESSION. HE MADE THREE GENERAL POINTS TO WHICH HE RETURNED AT FREQUENT INTERVALS:

A) SOMALIA MAY BE INVADED AT ANY TIME BY A COMBINATION OF POWERS WITH FAR GREATER MIGHT THAN SOMALIA POSSESSES.

B) SOMALIA NEEDS EXPEDITIOUSLY A FULL RANGE OF ARMAMENTS TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY.

C) SOMALIA LOOKS TO THE UNITED STATES AS THE ONLY POWER WHICH CAN CONSTRAIN THE SOVIET UNION, GUARANTEE SOMALIA'S BORDERS, AND ENSURE THE TRANQUILITY ESSENTIAL TO THE COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT.

2. FOLLOWING MY INITIAL PRESENTATION, SIAD SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S RESPONSE TO SOMALIA'S APPEAL. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE THAT SOMALIA WOULD NOT USE US-SUPPLIED WEAPONS AGAINST ANY COUNTRY EXCEPT IN THE DEFENSE OF SOMALIA. HE GAVE THAT ASSURANCE IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, BUT IF IT WERE NECESSARY HE WOULD
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REPEAT IT AGAIN IN WHATEVER FORM WAS REQUIRED. I TOLD SIAD WE HAD A LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR WRITTEN ASSURANCES, WHICH IN THE COURSE OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE PUBLIC. HE DID NOT OBJECT TO THAT.

3. I DID NOT GIVE SIAD A COPY OF THE LIST OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT, STATE 099321, WHICH ARRIVED AS I WAS JUST ABOUT TO DEPART THE EMBASSY. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TO COVER IN THIS SESSION WITHOUT GETTING DOWN TO THE DETAILS. (MOREOVER, I HAD NOT HAD SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO CHECK THE NOMENCLATURE OF SOME OF THE ITEMS.) THERE WAS IN MY VIEW, YET ANOTHER REASON FOR DELAY. I WANTED TO HAVE HIS RESPONSE TO MY LETTER IN HAND BEFORE GOING OVER THE LIST. I DID NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT I HAD JUST RECEIVED SUCH A LIST, AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IT WITH HIM SUBSEQUENTLY. IN DISCUSSING THE INITIAL IMPACT PACKAGE WITH SIAD, I SAID IT WAS ASSEMBLED ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE COULD PROVIDE IMMEDIATELY FROM THE SHELVES AND WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM AT ONCE. HE ACCEPTED THAT, AND SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE INCREASE MADE AS A RESULT OF HIS TALKS WITH MR. MOOSE.

4. IN DISCUSSING THE MILITARY SURVEY MISSION, I POINTED

OUT TO SIAD THAT IN MY TIME IN SOMALIA I HAD ONLY ONCE SEEN HIS DEFENSE MINISTER ON AN OFFICIAL CALL. I SAID IT WAS ENTIRELY UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT MORE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES UNLESS OUR RESPECTIVE MILITARY EXPERTS COULD AGREE UPON SOMALIA'S NEEDS. I ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY WE COULD MAKE A CONVINCING CASE TO THE PRESIDENT OR THE CONGRESS WITHOUT THE INDICATION THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT SOMALI TRUST IN A SURVEY MISSION WHICH WOULD HAVE TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF THE ARGUMENTATION. SIAD RATHER HALF-HEARTEDLY REPEATED THE ARGUMENT MADE TO MR. MOOSE, CONTENDING THAT IF PLANES AND TANKS WERE RULED OUT, THEN THERE WAS NO POINT IN A MISSION. I SAID THE TEAM PROPOSED TO EXAMINE SOMALIA'S IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM REQUIREMENTS. SIAD SAID, "ALL SECRET

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RIGHT, IF THEY WILL COME WITH AN OPEN MIND, THEY CAN COME". I SAID I THOUGHT THAT WAS AN ACCEPTABLE DEFINITION OF IMMEDIATE AND LONG-RANGE REQUIREMENTS.

5. SIAD WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE. HE SAID, "I HAVE NO PLANES". HE LISTENED CAREFULLY TO MY EXPOSITION THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE IN A BETTER POSITION THAN WE WERE TO PROVIDE WEAPONS IN THIS AREA, AND THAT WE WOULD INTERCEDE WITH THEM ON HIS BEHALF AS A PART OF OUR OVER-ALL PROGRAM OF SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA'S DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS.

6. THE SOMALI LEADER ARGUED AT LENGTH FOR A US GUARANTEE OF SOMALIA'S BORDERS. HE SAID SOMALIA HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE OGADEN AS REQUESTED, BUT THERE WAS NO EQUIVALENT WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET AND CUBAN FORCES FROM ETHIOPIA. THE UNITED STATES, HE CONTENDED, COULD HALT ANY POSSIBLE SOVIET ENCROACHMENT WITH A WORD. THE SOMALI PEOPLE WOULD THEN KEEP PEACE AND TRANQUILITY. I REVIEWED WITH SIAD THE SEVERAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO DEMONSTRATE ITS CONCERN FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE HORN. I MENTIONED THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 17 WAKE FOREST SPEECH, THE EXPLICIT LINKING OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE HORN TO SALT, AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS AS STEPS WHICH HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT US CONCERN IS SUBSTANTIAL. HE LISTENED TO THESE POINTS, BUT PRESSED FOR A SPECIFIC STATEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT OR AT MINIMUM A PUBLIC DECLARATION FROM THE USG ON SOMALIA'S BORDERS. HE SAID THERE WAS LITTLE HE COULD SAY AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN HIS PRESENT WEAKENED CONDITION. WITH NO DEFENSES, HE SAID, "I MUST BE CAUTIOUS", AND REFER TO SOVIET ACTIONS AS THE "NEW IMPERIALISM". "IF I WERE SURE THE UNITED SECRET

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STATES GUARANTEED OUR BORDERS, AND I HAD ADEQUATE DEFENSES, I WOULD THEN SPEAK OUT MORE PLAINLY. THE SOMALI PEOPLE TOO WOULD TAKE HEART, AND I COULD LEAD THEM IN TRANQUILITY TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT THEY SO BADLY NEED AND WANT".

7. SIAD THEN ADDRESSED THE ABORTIVE COUP, A SUBJECT WHICH I SHALL REPORT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE. HE ACCEPTED THE REFTEL LETTER, AND INDICATED I WOULD HAVE HIS RESPONSE SHORTLY. HE WAS CURCIOUSLY RETICENT ABOUT HIS TRIP TO CHINA, BUT THE SESSION HAD COVERED SO MUCH GROUND THAT I WAS RELUCTANT TO PRESS HIM ON THAT TOPIC.

8. COMMENT: I BELIEVE WE HAVE THE AGREEMENT WE HAVE SOUGHT FROM SIAD. THE PROOF WILL BE IN HIS WRITTEN RESPONSE. I DO NOT ANTICIPATE MUCH DELAY IN RECEIVING THAT DOCUMENT. SIAD WILL REGARD THE INITIAL IMPACT PACKAGE AS THE OPENING WEDGE IN AN ARMS-SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. HIS APPETITE FOR MORE WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL. (FORTUNATELY HE DID NOT CITE OUR STATISTICS ON SOVIET ARMS TO ETHIOPIA. HAD HE DONE SO HE MIGHT HAVE SAID YOUR CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR TOLD SENATORS THAT ETHIOPIA HAS RECEIVED A THOUSAND MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SOVIET AID. THAT MAKES YOUR OFFER COMPARED TO WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACTUALLY DELIVERED IN THE RATIO OF 1.5 TO 100.) I HOPE WE WILL MOVE PROMPTLY TO CONCERT WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ON COLLATERAL ASPECTS OF AN ARMS-SUPPLY PROBLEM. I SHOULD LIKE TO BRIEF MY NATO COLLEAGUES HERE AT THE SAME TIME. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO ME IN MY UPCOMING CONTACTS WITH SIAD IF I COULD DISCUSS TARGET TIMING ON THE SUBMISSION FOR FSM ELIGIBILITY, THE DELIVERY OF THE INITIAL IMPACT PACKAGE, THE DATE OF THE MILITARY SURVEY MISSION AND THE DATE WHEN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS ON ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS MIGHT BEGIN. SIAD, BY THE WAY, DID NOT RAISE FINANCING IN OUR DISCUSSION. LOUGHRAN UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS, SALES, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MILITARY SALES, CAT-B, MILITARY AGREEMENTS, MILITARY VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE102168
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: IO/UNA:BJSHARP
Enclosure: REPEAT OF MOGADISCIO 865
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N780004-0588
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780429/aaaaayqr.tel
Line Count: 209
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 922754a9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 78 STATE 96178
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 mar 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2885671
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ARMS SALES TO SOMALIA
TAGS: MASS, US, SO
To: USUN NEW YORK
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/922754a9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014